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STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
1. TAX INCREMENT FINANCING ACT Is CONSTITUTIONAL
Many states faced with urban blight have turned towards
new forms of redevelopment financing in an effort to eliminate
deterioration and to encourage private investment. South Caro-
lina's new Tax Increment Financing Law1 withstood a constitu-
tional challenge in the recent decision of Wolper v. City Coun-
cil.2 The supreme court's opinion, written by Chief Justice Ness,
illustrates the constitutional strength and unique character of
this relatively new type of redevelopment financing.
The plaintiff, Jane Wolper, brought a declaratory judgment
action against the City Council of Charleston to determine the
city's right to issue tax increment revenue bonds. The issuance
of the bonds had been proposed through a city ordinance en-
acted pursuant to the South Carolina Tax Increment Financing
Act.3 The Act authorizes municipalities to incur indebtedness
for the redevelopment of areas suffering from urban blight. As
the property in the redevelopment area increases in value, the
debt is repaid through revenue gained from increased ad
valorem property taxes. Before any redevelopment bonds are is-
sued, the city must determine that the property values in the
target area are either static or in decline.4 The tax value of the
property in the area is then frozen. Any tax revenue derived
from an increase in property value above the "frozen base" is
diverted to a special fund from which the redevelopment bonds
are retired.5 Revenue derived from the "frozen base" portion
continues to be paid to the same funds as it did before the plan
was initiated.6
After her complaint was dismissed by the trial court, the
appellant raised four constitutional issues on appeal. Her first
1. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 31-6-10 to -120 (Supp. 1985)(effective June 19, 1984).
2. 287 S.C. 209, 336 S.E.2d 871 (1985).
3. Brief of Appellant at 2.
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argument asserted that the diversion of ad valorem taxes to a
special fund impaired the contractual rights of the city's general
obligation bondholders to receive this revenue.7 The supreme
court reasoned, however, that the general obligation bondholders
would receive the same amount of revenue from the "frozen
base" as they would have if the plan had not been imple-
mented." The appellant next argued that the financing act cre-
ated general obligation debt without regard to the constitutional
ceiling on such debt.9 In response, the court explained that tax
increment bonds differ from general obligation debt because
they are not secured by the full faith, credit, and taxing power of
the municipality.10 The bondholders may not look beyond the
special fund and the project itself for security.11 Tax increment
bonds, therefore, are not as potentially burdensome on munici-
palities as general obligation debt and are not subject to the
same debt limitation.
The appellant argued further that the Act violates article
ten, section five of the South Carolina Constitution because it
imposes a tax levy for an undeclared purpose."2 The court, how-
ever, reasoned that since the Act simply diverts tax revenue, it
imposes no new tax. Therefore, it is not a tax levy.' 3 Finally, the
appellant asserted that the Act was unconstitutional because it
failed to serve a public purpose. 4 South Carolina is one of sev-
eral states that has included a public purpose requirement for
issuance of revenue bonds in its state constitution. 5 The state
courts have been reluctant to define public purpose, however,
viewing the concept as a fluid one that should be determined on
7. Id. at 213-14, 336 S.E.2d at 873-74. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 4 prohibits the enactment
of any law which impairs the obligation of contracts.
8. Id. at 213, 336 S.E.2d at 874.
9. Id. at 214, 336 S.E.2d at 874. The constitutional debt limitation is set forth in S.C.
CONST. art. X, § 14(7).
10. Id.
11. Id; see Brief of Municipal Association of South Carolina as Amicus Curiae at A-
7.
12, 287 S.C. at 214, 336 S.E.2d at 874.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 215, 336 S.E.2d at 875; see S.C. CoNsT. art. I, § 3. Although the pleading
was improper, Chief Justice Ness recognized the importance of this issue and chose to
address it.
15. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 3. Alaska, Wyoming, and Illinois also have public purpose
requirements in their state constitutions. See Gillete, Fiscal Federalism and the Use of
Municipal Bond Proceeds, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1030, 1035 n.19 (1983).
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a case-by-case basis.16 Relevant factors have included the "pro-
motion of public health, safety, morals, general welfare, security,
prosperity, and contentment of all the inhabitants. . . ."I' The
supreme court in Wolper agreed with the trial court's determi-
nation that the target area in Charleston posed a threat to both
health and safety and that the public would be the primary ben-
eficiaries of any redevelopment. 18 The court noted that any ben-
efit to private developers was incidental to the public purpose of
renewal. 19
The supreme court's treatment of public purpose is note-
worthy when viewed with recent precedent. In an earlier case,
Byrd v. County of Florence,20 the court set out a four-part pub-
lic purpose test that was used in the context of a general obliga-
tion bond issuance.2 Justice Ness dissented, finding this test too
stringent. 2 In Wolper, therefore, Chief Justice Ness veered away
from this precedent. He gave the concept a broader reading by
alluding to general notions of public health and welfare.23
Wolper gives courts considerably more latitude when dealing
with the public purpose issue. Moreover, the decision was made
easier by the structure of the act. Section 31-6-30 requires five of
fourteen conditions to be present before the target area is con-
sidered "blighted. '24 In addition, if the area is vacant, the act
declares that economic growth is impaired if two of four condi-
tions are met.25 The Act, therefore, protects itself through these
safeguards from a public purpose challenge.26
The supreme court's decision recognizes the need for urban
redevelopment in some areas. Although the courts have discre-
tion in imposing a public purpose requirement on a particular
project, deference is given to the municipality provided that it
16. Byrd v. County of Florence, 281 S.C. 402, 404, 315 S.E.2d 804, 805 (1984).
17. Id.
18. 287 S.C. at 216, 336 S.E.2d at 875.
19. Id. See generally Davidson, Tax Increment Financing as a Tool for Community
Redevelopment, 56 U. DEW. J. URB. L. 405, 440-42 (1979).
20. 281 S.C. 402, 315 S.E.2d 804 (1984).
21. Id. at 407, 315 S.E.2d at 806.
22. Id. at 410, 315 S.E.2d at 808 (Ness, J., dissenting).
23. 287 S.C. at 216, 336 S.E.2d at 875.
24. S.C. CODE ANN. § 31-6-30(1) (Supp. 1985).
25. Id.
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works within the guidelines supplied by the act. Because this
kind of redevelopment financing is essentially self-sustaining,
the need for debt limitation is markedly less than it is for gen-
eral obligation debt. Tax increment bonds are sui generis, and
the court properly distinguished them from general obligation
bonds. Tax increment financing has become a viable way for ur-
ban areas to raise money without the bureaucracy associated
with federal assistance programs. After Wolper, municipalities
in South Carolina should make greater use of tax increment fi-
nancing as a way to alleviate blight and to encourage private
investment.
Douglas Manning Muller
II. BUSINESS LICENSE TAX ON REVENUES FROM INTRASTATE
TOLL TELEPHONE CALLS IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
In Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. City of
Spartanburg28 the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed a cir-
cuit court order voiding the business license tax imposed on
Southern Bell by the City of Spartanburg. The case arose when
Spartanburg amended its business license ordinance in 1979 to
tax telephone companies for local and intrastate business trans-
acted in the city.29 Under the amendment, Southern Bell, which
for many years had been the largest ad valorem taxpayer in the
city,30 also became the largest license taxpayer in Spartanburg.
Southern Bell paid the taxes under protest and brought an
action for refund, claiming the license tax violated its rights
under the equal protection clauses of the South Carolina and
United States Constitutions. The circuit court held that the tax
denied equal protection of the laws because the city had no
power to tax intrastate toll calls or revenues from services ren-
dered to customers residing outside the city limits and that
27. Davidson, supra note 20, at 443.
28. 285 S.C. 495, 331 S.E.2d 333 (1985).
29. Id. at 496, 331 S.E.2d 334. The tax applied to Southern Bell's revenues from the
entire Spartanburg exchange, although approximately 32,000 of the 47,000 customers in
the exchange resided outside of the Spartanburg city limits. Record at 21.
30. Id. at 497 n.2, 331 S.E.2d at 334 n.2. Its license tax rate increased 900% to
1000%. A textile or manufacturing plant with the same revenue paid a maximum of
$725. Id. at 497, 331 S.E.2d at 335.
[Vol. 38
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there was no rational ground for the disparity of rates imposed
on different businesses.31 The supreme court affirmed.
The court agreed with the lower court's holding that the
city had no power to tax intrastate toll (long-distance) calls
made from or charged to a Spartanburg exchange number. Both
courts relied on Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co. v.
City of Aiken,32 in which the supreme court affirmed a circuit
court holding that intrastate toll calls must be eliminated from
Southern Bell's business license tax basis. The circuit court held
that the inclusion of intrastate toll calls would allow Aiken to
tax outside of its territorial jurisdiction, that there was no ra-
tional manner in which such calls could be apportioned among
various taxing jurisdictions, and that Triplett v. City of
Chester33 was inapplicable to the situation.
It is clear after Aiken and Spartanburg that municipalities
cannot include in the revenues of telephone companies those
revenues derived from intrastate toll calls. This is a sound deci-
sion since a number of jurisdictions may be involved in the re-
laying of a long-distance call.3 4 The connection between a mu-
nicipality and a telephone company involved in the mere relay
of a toll call is too tenuous to characterize the activity as doing
business within that city.
Although the supreme court affirmed the lower court's deci-
sion that the city lacked power to tax services rendered to cus-
tomers outside the city limits, the proposition does not apply in
31. Record at 25.
32. 279 S.C. 269, 306 S.E.2d 220 (1983). In Aiken Southern Bell had appealed from
a judgment enforcing Aiken's license tax ordinance. In its cross-appeal, the city urged
that the trial court erred in holding that Aiken had no power to include intrastate toll
calls in the revenues of Southern Bell for business license tax purposes.
33. 209 S.C. 455, 40 S.E.2d 684 (1946). In Triplett the taxpayer challenged the ap-
plicability of Chester's license tax to him when all the paving work he did was performed
outside the city limits. The court found for Chester, holding that "[t]he right of a munic-
ipal corporation to impose a tax of this kind upon a corporation or business conducted
within the city limits, although a portion of the business is carried on or the transaction
is factually completed outside such municipality, is generally recognized." Id. at 461-62,
40 S.E.2d at 686.
34. Although distinguishable, this issue is analogous to the issue of taxation of ser-
vices rendered to customers residing outside city limits. Spartanburg and Aiken held
that intrastate toll calls cannot be included in taxable revenues whether the customer
resides in the city or not. See 285 S.C. at 495, 331 S.E.2d at 333; Aiken, 279 S.C. at 269,
336 S.E.2d at 220.
1986]
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all circumstances. The court did not mention Triplett,35 which
presumably remains valid. As noted in Triplett, "[i]t frequently
happens that there is a business located within a municipality
that does not do all of its business within the corporate limits of
such town or city." 6 The degree of connection between the ex-
traterritorial activities of a business and the city seems to be the
proper way to determine the propriety of including revenues
from such activities in the tax basis of a business license tax-
payer.3 7 The absence of a formula by which to apportion shares
of intrastate calls, rather than the extraterritorial nature of such
calls, was the foundation for Circuit Judge Peeples' decision in
Aiken. The court concluded that Aiken could not tax the calls.38
The technological complexities of the telephone industry under-
lie the holdings in Spartanburg and Aiken that services to cus-
tomers outside city limits cannot be taxed by cities. In a differ-
ent situation, such as that in Triplett, a city may have the power
to tax the revenues of a concern even though some of the reve-
nues are derived from services rendered to customers outside the
city limits.39
In ruling that the tax violated Southern Bell's rights of
equal protection, the court relied on two cases in which insur-
ance companies challenged municipal license taxes. The court
referred to United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. City of
Newberry,'40 which involved a challenge by an insurer to a busi-
ness license tax rate which was seven times higher than the next
35. 209 S.C. 455, 40 S.E.2d 684 (1946).
36. Id. at 459, 49 S.E.2d at 685 (emphasis in original).
37. In Triplett the court found that although a taxpayer's paving work was done
outside of the city, his equipment was stored in town, and the managerial and executive
aspects of the business were carried on in the city of Chester. On these facts the court
found the business license tax properly applicable to the taxpayer. Id. In Spartanburg
the particular nature of the telephone services rendered outside the city limits made the
connection much less strong. Nonresident Spartanburg exchange customers may activate
equipment in Spartanburg when making calls, but the billing and other managerial du-
ties of Southern Bell relevant to those customers are chiefly performed elsewhere. Rec-
ord at 166.
38. The trial judge implicitly recognized that cities might properly tax revenues de-
rived from services outside the city depending upon the particular circumstances when
he deemed Triplett inapplicable to the facts of Aiken. He noted that the court in
Triplett did not seem to consider the extent to which a city may lawfully tax the extra-
territorial revenues of a business. Brief of Respondent at 40.
39. See Triplett, 209 S.C. at 461-62, 40 S.E.2d at 686.
40. 257 S.C. 433, 186 S.E.2d 239 (1972).
202 [Vol. 38
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two categories of businesses and twenty times higher than all
other categories.4 The Newberry court affirmed the basic pro-
position that a city may tax different business classes at differ-
ent rates. In addition, Newberry held that a presumption of va-
lidity attaches to license taxes, and courts should not interfere
with such taxes unless they are clearly unreasonable and oppres-
sive. A plaintiff who challenges license taxes has the burden of
proving invalidity.
42
Thus, one attacking a license tax must show some disparity
between rates of different classes. If sufficient disparity is shown,
the burden shifts to the city to justify it.43 The court in Spar-
tanburg found that Southern Bell met its burden. It deemed the
disparity in tax rates "gross" and held that Spartanburg did not
meet its burden because it failed to advance a reasonable basis
for the differential treatment.44 The court implied that the tax
could have been justified if the increase had been part of an
overhaul of the entire ordinance and if the city had shown that
Southern Bell benefited from city services more than other busi-
nesses. This latter consideration was recognized as a justification
for disparate tax rates in United States Fidelity and Guaranty
Co. v. City of Spartanburg," upon which the court relied.
A business license tax, therefore, is presumed valid, and a
taxpayer must show a disparity before the courts will interfere.
If a disparity is shown, the burden shifts to the city to justify
the tax rate. It is unclear exactly how disparate the tax rates
41. Id. at 437, 186 S.E.2d at 240.
42. Id. at 438, 186 S.E.2d at 241.
43. In Newberry the court found a "gross" disparity and remanded the case "to give
the city of Newberry an opportunity upon trial to justify, if it can, the classification and
rate of tax as being constitutionally permissible." Id. at 443, 186 S.E.2d at 243.
44. 285 S.C. at 497, 331 S.E.2d at 335.
45. 263 S.C. 167, 209 S.E.2d 36 (1974), affd, 420 U.S. 968 (1975). In this case, the
disparity of rates was substantial enough to incite inquiry, but the tax was found to be
justifiable for two reasons. First, insurance companies benefit from city services such as
fire and police protection more than other business. Second, the insured pays little ad
valorem tax. The court in Spartanburg also noted that Southern Bell was the largest ad
valorem taxpayer in the city. 285 S.C. at 497 n.2, 331 S.E.2d at 334 n.2. Interestingly, the
supreme court in North Charleston Land Corp. v. City of N. Charleston, 281 S.C. 470,
316 S.E.2d 137 (1984), held that the fact that certain businesses paid high ad valorem
taxes and required little in the way of city services was a rational basis for exempting the
businesses for license taxation. The supreme court recently reaffirmed the basic validity
of disparate tax rates for different classes of businesses in Thompson Newspapers, Inc. v.
City of Florence, 287 S.C. 305, 338 S.E.2d 324 (1985).
1986] 203
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must be before inciting inquiry. In Spartanburg the central rea-
son for the court's finding may have been the city's motive to
drastically increase the tax on Southern Bell, since Duke Power
had agreed to pay the city three percent of its gross revenues. 6
Spartanburg makes clear that cities may not tax revenues
derived by telephone companies from long-distance intrastate
calls and service to customers outside city limits. The decision
regarding nonresident customers is narrow and should not be in-
terpreted to mean that cities may not under any circumstances
tax revenues derived from services to customers outside city lim-
its. The particular nature of the telephone service business ac-
counts for the cited holdings regarding intrastate toll calls and
nonresident customers. The reasoning behind these decisions
may be of limited use in other situations involving city license
taxes. The equal protection analysis in Spartanburg, however, is
more broad and has wider application to license taxation in gen-
eral. Spartanburg is useful to those attacking or defending a li-
cense ordinance. The supreme court gives cities notice that al-
though their power to tax businesses is largely discretionary, this
power is not unfettered. Cities must be prepared to defend a tax
rate which places a substantially higher burden on one particu-
lar class of business.
Alec Bramlett
46. 285 S.C. at 498, 331 S.E.2d at 335.
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